Grasping at Straws: Justifying the War in Afghanistan

Apparently White House Press Secretary Jay Carney was caught stumbling for an answer recently on Afghanistan. Via Glenn Greenwald, George Zornick at Nation followed up:

Finally, ABC’s Jake Tapper asked Carney when was “the last time US troops in Afghanistan killed anybody associated with Al Qaeda.” Carney didn’t have an answer, and referred Tapper to the Defense Department and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force.

I queried those agencies Tuesday and got an answer today. According to a Defense Department spokesman, the most recent operation that killed an Al Qaeda fighter was in April 2011—ten months ago. However, there was an “Al Qaeda foreign fighter” captured near Kabul in May 2011, and an “Al Qaeda facilitator” captured in the Paktiya province on January 30 of this year.

By comparison, there have been 466 coalition fatalities since April 2011.

Given Carney’s repeated insistence that the “number one”  purpose of the American mission is to “disrupt, dismantle and ultimately defeat” Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and given the ongoing sacrifices the country is making to achieve that goal, it’s very important to keep these benchmarks in mind. It is surprising Carney wasn’t aware of them, or didn’t disclose them—though, perhaps it’s not.

Homs Rebels Retreat as Evidence of US Intervention Withers

The breaking news right now is that Syrian opposition fighters in Homs have withdrawn from the city, saying their decision was based on “worsening humanitarian conditions, lack of food and medicine and water, electricity and communication cuts as well as shortages in weapons.”

There has been some disagreement in antiwar circles about Syria. Many observers have recognized the unstable situation, the armed revolt, Western propaganda, etc. and become convinced that the U.S. and its allies are deeply involved in Syria, fomenting a civil war by aiding the opposition fighters. I’ve never been convinced this was true, although as far back as early June I warned about the possibility of a direct intervention by the U.S., and advocated strongly against it. Today’s news that the opposition factions in Homs – the main theater of the insurrection – are retreating due to lack of aid and supplies tends to puncture the argument that they’ve been receiving any considerable Western support.

Furthermore, if we look at official statements just in the past few days, we see Washington and its allies strongly against direct military intervention. Secretary of State Clinton on Thursday of last week told CBS News that “We have made no decisions” about arming the opposition (read the full transcript here). She made the argument that such an intervention may escalate the violence, that the logistics of arming the opposition are too difficult, and that we know too little of the non-cohesive fighting groups, pointing out that “al-Qaida” and “Zawahiri is supporting the opposition in Syria. Are we supporting al-Qaida in Syria? Hamas is now supporting the opposition. Are we supporting Hamas in Syria?”

Josh Rogin reports today that NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told him in an interview that “NATO assets won’t be used to deliver any military, humanitarian, or medical assistance” in Syria. “We haven’t had any discussions in NATO about a NATO role in Syria and I don’t envision such a role for the alliance,” he said, adding “The guiding question should be: Would it bring a sustainable solution to the problem if we decided to intervene, if we had the legal basis, if we had support from the region?” and answering that question in the negative.

I’m not one to take state officials at their word, but balancing them with available evidence is still important. There is some minor intervention from some of our allies in the Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. And Turkey is sheltering defectors and has possibly let weapons come through the border, along with Lebanon. Some arms have also come into Syria through Iraq. But none of this has amounted to much at all and none of it is sufficient evidence of U.S. support for the Syrian opposition. There have been reports claiming NATO and Western secret agencies were covertly harboring and indirectly giving arms to Syrian rebels, reports that I never found to have been corroborated and which have been denied by reporters like Nir Rosen, who has been on the ground with the Syrian opposition. I’ve recognized and written extensively about the push by numerous influential voices in the U.S. to intervene on the rebels’ behalf, and I don’t deny the possibility that something is going on behind the scenes that the public isn’t privy to, but the evidence simply isn’t there.

Unfortunately, some but certainly not all within these aforementioned antiwar circles choose to equate the recognition that the U.S. has not intervened with being a supporter of proxy terrorism or U.S. imperialism. Of course, it’s possible to have a different opinion on what actual overt and covert U.S. policy towards Syria is, and not actually support foreign intervention or the imperialists in Washington.

Poll: Most Israelis Oppose Attacking Iran, Especially Absent US Support

Thought I would draw quick attention to these poll results from Maryland professor and Brookings Institution scholar Shibley Telhami. “Only 19 percent of Israelis polled expressed support for an attack without U.S. backing,” writes Telhami, “according to a poll I conducted — fielded by Israel’s Dahaf Institute Feb. 22-26 — while 42 percent endorsed a strike only if there is at least U.S. support, and 32 percent opposed an attack regardless.”

Other results:

A majority of Israelis polled, roughly 51 percent, said the war would last months (29 percent) or years (22 percent), while only 18 percent said it would last days. About as many Israelis, 44 percent, think that an Israeli strike would actually strengthen Iran’s government as think it would weaken it (45 percent).

…Only 22 percent of Israelis said a strike would delay Iran’s capabilities by more than five years, while an additional 31 percent said it would delay its capabilities by one to five years, 18 percent said it would not make a difference and 11 percent said it would actually accelerate Iran’s capabilities. In a similar poll I conducted (also with Dahaf) last November, 90 percent of Israelis expressed the view that Iran will eventually acquire nuclear weapons.

Paul Pillar comments, saying that Obama should – but won’t – talk about these types of things to the Israelis, AIPAC next week, and in public generally.

Of course, if the president were to speak in such terms he would be met with a chorus of denunciation by American critics who already have been arguing that the military option should be talked up, not down, and that saber rattling is the best way to get Iranian attention and Iranian concessions. But political and psychological imperatives mean that the response of Supreme Leader Khamenei or other Iranian leaders to saber rattling is more likely to be to dig in their heels and be more conscious than ever of the need not to show weakness.

See also Ali Gharib.

The U.S. has been pretty clear in opposing a military strike on Iran at least for now. And Gen. Martin Dempsey has said that if Israel strikes Iran, they won’t get U.S. help. But I view that more as political grandstanding. If Israel attacked Iran, and Iran reciprocated in any way (something they’ve pretty much promised), I simply don’t see the U.S. staying out of it. Any Iranian retaliation will prompt a military response from the U.S. The question really seems to be, will Israel call Dempsey’s bluff?

As I’ve lamented before: The fact that a reckless, unjustified Israeli war of aggression in the Middle East should warrant costly U.S. involvement as Israel’s protectorate shows the perversity of U.S. foreign policy.

When Military Leaders Go Antiwar

You know, I don’t give military officials enough credit sometimes. NIAC reports on a CSIS panel last week, quoting former military officials on whether or not to attack Iran:

“We are reaching this crescendo of talk – just constant – war, war, war,” said former CENTCOM Commander, Admiral William J. Fallon.  “It’s almost like the old movie, the black and white, beating the drum, and the galley slaves.  And the chant goes on.  Certainly not very helpful at all.”

Fallon spoke on a panel hosted by CSIS along with former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright last week.  The panelists were in firm agreement that a military operation to try to stop Iran’s nuclear program is a bad option for the United States.

When asked if a military strike could prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, General Cartwright replied bluntly, “no.”  He explained, “you’re not going to kill the intellectual capital to just rebuild the centrifuges someplace else and continue on.”

Asked whether others in the military believed that a military strike on Iran would be prudent, the men indicated they did not. “No one that I’m aware of [in the military] thinks that there’s any real positive outcome of a military strike or some kind of conflict,” Admiral Fallon said.

…”At the end of the day,” said Admiral Fallon, “these are people – 70,000,000 of them.  They have aspirations and desires, and there needs to be room for demonstrated cooperation and a willingness to walk away from things that are detrimental to the region–that there’s something in this for them.  And so, having some light at the end of the tunnel, not closing off all options, but letting them know ‘hey, we’re willing to have you play a role in the region.  You got a lot of capability, you got a lot of smart people, a lot of things you could really be helpful [with] if you decided to be cooperative in your dealings with your neighbors.'”

Admiral William J. Fallon and General James Cartwright are echoing current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey’s statements in recent weeks, that an attack on Iran would be pointless, dangerous, and unwise.

The message is not just anti-attacking-Iran and pro-peaceful-negotiations, but it also is a sincere attempt to get people to understand that the leadership in Iran is not some crazed, almost caricatured monolith. The media’s propaganda on Iran, and much of the talk from half-retarded politicians, paints the regime as an evil, fanatical, uncompromising group of people committed both to terrorism and the apocalyptic destruction of Israel and everyone in it. These military men are saying: no, if you simply talk to them and give them options and understand their incentive structure, war can easily be avoided.

Various hawks in Washington in part base their pro-war jingoism and faultless American exceptionalism on being pro-military and pro-soldier. From that hellish trio of Senators Lindsey Graham, John McCain, and Joe Lieberman to the GOP contenders, much of that ideological rhetoric is based on elevating the top military brass to a heroic, almost sacred stature. Yet they still continue the pro-war rhetoric and systematic threat-inflation, despite the sensible, even antiwar talk coming from people like Fallon, Cartwright, and Dempsey. We don’t see them modifying their positions based on what the military leadership says.

It’s notable that the political pressure to support monstrous aggression and intervention abroad seems to come from the media and the politicians, not – at least in this case – from the military and intelligence community. The political spectrum basically has room for pro-war and very pro-war and this appears to feed on itself. The American people are fickle enough that if the admirals and generals were the ones they listened to instead of demagoguing politicians, they’d exercise more sober thinking here as well. But the people don’t hear Dempsey or Panetta or Clapper making the case against war; they hear the Santorums and Ed Schultzes of the world.

[Just as an aside, this is not to give undue credit to the military and intelligence community. While they and the administration have been decidedly against preemptively striking Iran, policies like crippling sanctions, covert war, and military encirclement are regressive and are more likely to be a prelude to war than doing what ought to be done (i.e. negotiations, dropping the double standard on Israel, etc.).]