What follows is from Dutch investigative journalist Eric van de Beek, who has covered Dutch involvement in the MH17 coverup like a junkyard dog – in the tradition of the late Robert Parry. Bob also wrote extensively about the MH17 charade on Consortium News, the website he founded. Here are van de Beek’s remarks; they are well worth adding to the information he provided yesterday:
Most Dutch people have been led to believe that the original U.S satellite imagery had been available to the prosecutor and court before last week’s court proceeding that ended up imposing life sentences (in absentia) on two Russians and one pro-Russian Ukrainian. In reality, the satellite imagery had not been made available, as anyone who listened carefully to what was said in court should have known.
The lawyers for Pulatov (who was not convicted) talked about the imagery in extenso on June 22, 2020. The true story about the satellite imagery is that someone from the Dutch Military Intelligence Service (MIVD) received a classified report from the DNI (U.S. Director of National Intelligence) about what the satellite imagery showed, not the imagery itself. This was reported to the Prosecution Service and was included in the case file. In sum, neither the Prosecution nor the court received the actual satellite imagery from the U.S.
It gets worse. The intercepts from Ukrainian intelligence weren’t “meticulously vetted and assessed untampered with” as claimed. Just the opposite.
The Prosecution refused to answer the question of Pulatov’s lawyers regarding whether the audio files were authentic. On November 1, 2021 the court made known that the Prosecution had never ordered any technical research on the files. I was flabbergasted when I heard this, but the Dutch media kept silent.
The reason given was that the Dutch Nation Forensic Institute was not able to perform this kind of technical research. They claimed they had no certified specialist in the house! Also on November 1, 2021, the court made known that they had asked the National Forensic Institute of Lithuania to assess 14 Pulatov intercepts. That Institute found these were not the original audio files! Moreover, no one checked on voice cloning; lack of the tools to do so was the explanation given.
The Prosecution presented three photographs and six videos of a Buk Telar, which is a transporter-erector-launcher-and-radar for the Buk missile.) It claimed that all imagery was taken in rebel-held territory on 17 July. The Telar was identified by a Dutch police officer as a Russian Telar.
There are many issues with these photos and videos. (It is not without reason that I dedicated a full chapter to this in my book.) None of this imagery was published before the shoot-down, and in almost all cases the photographers are unknown. The Joint Investigation Team seems to have received only two files physically, on two Secure Digital cards. The others were downloads from social media or file transfer services.
Even the files on the SD cards, which include a dashcam video, have serious issues. For example, the dashcam video contains a 2012 timestamp. According to the person who filmed from his car this was due to a malfunctioning battery. Police officers of the JIT then asked him if he remembered when he shot the video. He said this must have been somewhere in July, a few days before he heard about the crash. Despite that testimony, the Prosecution claimed the video was shot on 17 July 2014, the day of the shoot-down.