To Hell with Ted Rall. Now Tell Me Where He’s Wrong.

This essay by Ted Rall has sent Instaredundant and his posse into a holy furor. “Rall supports the Iraqi insurgents!” shrieks the blob.

Come on, guys, that’s simple-minded even for you. But let’s grant that Rall is, in Reynolds’ words (actually, he probably took them from someone else), a “loathsome human being.” Fine. Now address the message itself, and tell me that this is not exactly what the insurgents believe and say to potential recruits. If this is their reasoning–and it pretty clearly is–then what the hell sort of victory can we expect in Iraq? Reynolds’ circle of jerks hates Ted Rall for the same reason the government hates Nathaniel Heatwole– he has kicked over their theoretical fortress of toothpicks.


From Wednesday’s Today show:

Couric: “You say you’re not a hero…”
Lynch: “No.”
Couric: “…you’re a survivor.”
Lynch: “Exactly.”
Couric: “But, Rick, you think Jessica Lynch is a hero.”
Bragg: “Yeah, we’ve argued about this, too, a lot. But, you know, I’ve said this before, I think that every soldier there, every sergeant with two children at home, every soldier like Lori Piestewa who have the guts to crawl into the cab of a truck and go into a war while the rest of us sit at home watching it on the news, I think they’re heroes. I think they have to be. And I don’t — obviously, there are soldiers who were the dramatic hero, though, the ones who attack mortar positions and more of what we think of as the pure American hero, but I think it takes a certain amount of heroism to just go.
Couric: “And survive.”
Bragg: “Yeah.”

Note that when Lynch uses the term “survivor,” she’s downplaying her own accomplishment, which, let’s be frank, amounts to respiring, albeit under harrowing circumstances. Lynch thus showed herself to be far more morally astute than Couric or Bragg.

Marxian Exploitation

The requirement that an object have utility is a necessary component of the labor theory of value, if it is to avoid certain objections. Suppose a person works on something absolutely useless that no one wants. For example, he spends his hours efficiently making a big knot; no one else can do it more quickly. Will this object be that many hours valuable? A theory should not have this consequence. Marx avoids it as follows: “Nothing can have value without being an object of utility. If a thing is useless so is the labor contained in it; the labor does not count as labor, and therefore creates no value.” Isn’t this an ad hoc restriction? Given the rest of the theory, why does it apply? Why doesn’t all efficiently done labor create value? If one has to bring in the fact that it’s of use to people and actually wanted (suppose it were of use, but no one wanted it), then perhaps by looking only at wants, which have to be brought in anyway, one can get a complete theory of value.

Even with the ad hoc constraint that the object must be of some use, there remain problems. For, suppose someone works for 563 hours on something of some very slight utility. This satisfies the necessary condition for value that the object have some utility. Is its value now determined by the amount of labor, yielding the consequence that it is incredibly valuable? No. “For the labor spent on them (commodities) counts effectively only insofar as it is spent in a form that is useful to others.” Marx goes on to say: “Whether that labor is useful for others, and its product consequently capable of satisfying the wants of others, can be proved only by the act of exchange.” If we interpret Marx as saying, not that utility is a necessary condition and that (once satisfied) the amount of labor determines value, but rather that the degree of utility will determine how much (useful) labor has been expended on the object, then we have a theory very different from a labor theory of value.

We can approach this issue from another direction. Suppose that useful things are produced as efficiently as they can be, but that too many of them are produced to sell at a certain price. The price that clears the market is lower than the apparent labor values of the objects; a greater number of efficient hours went into producing them than people are willing to pay for (at a certain price per hour). Does this show that the number of average hours devoted to making an object of significant utility doesn’t determine its value? Marx’s reply is that if there is such overproduction so that the market doesn’t clear at a particular price, then the labor was inefficiently used (less of the thing should have been made), even thought the labor itself wasn’t inefficient. Hence not all of those labor hours constituted socially necessary labor time. The object does not have a value less than the socially necessary number of labor hours expended upon it, for there were fewer socially necessary labor hours expended upon it than meet the eye.

“Suppose that every piece of linen in the market contains no more labor-time than is socially necessary. In spite of this, all the pieces taken as a whole may have had superfluous labor time spent upon them. If the market cannot stomach the whole quantity at the normal price of 2 shillings a yard, this proves that too great a portion of the total labor of the community has been expended in the form of weaving. The effect is the same as if each weaver had expended more labor-time upon his particular product than is socially necessary. (Marx, Capital, p. 120)

Thus Marx holds that this labor isn’t all socially necessary. What is socially necessary, and how much of it is, will be determined by what happens on the market! There is no longer any labor theory of value; the central notion of socially necessary labor time is itself defined in terms of the processes and exchange ratios of a competitive market!

– Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia

Thomas Friedman’s Auto Eroticism

Why does NYT‘s Thomas Friedman keep calling Iraq a car? Can you really drive without a steering wheel? Has Hertz or Avis ever gotten back a spotless rental? These and other questions answered by Matt Taibbi, who concludes:

There is only one reason why muddle-headed idiots like Thomas Friedman can exist as prominent spokespersons in the United States. It’s because muddle-headed policies require muddle-headed people to champion them.